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Abstract This article examines the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in
an economy with warm-glow altruism (utility interdependence) and hetero-
geneous individuals. We propose a new efficiency concept, D-efficiency, that
considers an implicit constraint in the act of giving: Donors cannot bequeath
to donees more than their existing resources. Considering this constraint,
we show that the market equilibrium is not socially efficient. The efficient
level of bequest transfers can be implemented by the market with estate and
labor-income subsidies and a capital-income tax. In the absence of lump-sum
taxation, the government faces a trade-off between minimizing distortions
and eliminating external effects. The implied tax policy differs from Pigovian
taxation since the government’s ability to correct the external effects is lim-
ited. Finally, we show that the efficiency-equity trade-off does not affect the
qualitative features of the optimal distortionary fiscal policy.
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